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Abstract: Many European countries faced with large fiscal deficits have adopted great plans of 
austerity to limit their public debt. In Romania, despite many measures to reduce public sector wages 
and some social allowances, in the 2009 and 2010 has been recorded only a small contraction of 
governmental expenditure but a fast growing public debt. However, the main effects of the austerity 
measures have materialized in a significant reduction in domestic demand and an important reduction 
of gross domestic product. Also, despite a substantial reduction of supply, the unemployment rate has 
not exceeded 8% in Romania. This paper aims to analyze how much the policies restricting budget 
deficit and public debt in Romania delayed the resumption of economic growth. Even the euro 
adoption perspective impose a stricter management of Romanian budgetary policies and other 
nominal convergence criteria, the hard core of economic policies must be the reinventing a new path 
to sustainable growth. It is necessary to conclude a new financing agreement with IMF for the next 
two years? We also intend to test the tolerance degree of the Romanian economy to public debt 
expansion (according to Reinhart&Rogoff model, 2010) as reflected in the growth rate of real gross 
domestic product. 
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Brief Review of Classical Economic Theory 
Fiscal deficit and public debt were certainly the most affected nominal 
convergence criteria by current economic crisis. The influence of excessive deficits 
and debt on macroeconomic stability and the ability to resume economic growth 
has been a constant concern since the Second World War. 
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Since the ‘50s, James Buchanan and Richard Wagner have proposed to define the 
burden of public debt from its analogy with the tax burden and paying attention to 
the following issues: who pays, how much and when? For Buchanan and Wagner 
(1958: 29)the burden of public debt is nothing but “the opportunity cost of public 
goods, which are financed through debt”. In the standard sense, the opportunity 
cost is measured by the value of sacrificed alternatives. With public debt, 
opportunity cost is the value of private goods that are given up in exchange for the 
public goods that debt issue makes possible. 
With the same objectives, James Meade and Franco Modigliani have analyzed 
long-term implications of public debt on economic growth and the consequences in 
the field of intergenerational equity.  
James Meade (1958: 163-183) believes that a clear distinction must be made 
between external debt and domestic debt. While external debt is a burden for the 
community, because it produces real goods and services transfers between debtor 
and creditor, domestic debt is a transfer from citizens, as taxpayers, to citizens as 
property owners and so nothing is lost.  
Franco Modigliani (1961: 82) argued that despite the fact that government action to 
expand the deficit could involve a future cost for society this does not mean that 
action should be taken. In terms of intergenerational income gains Modigliani sees 
much more significant the present than the sacrifices in the future, and if 
government spending for projects that produce a yield in the future, gross debt 
burden could be offset by the expense and the gross yield net result would be quite 
positive. 
Robert Barro (1979: 940-971) has demonstrated that the public debt will be, sooner 
or later, moved into taxation field, leading to a higher taxation and reducing the 
production potential. Barro approved that there are also alternative like the 
limitation of government spending, which will have as well contractions effect on 
production. Debt maturity structure is also important to note that as Robert Barro is 
an obvious link between inflation and real cost of debt as long-term government 
debt is extremely vulnerable to inflation.  
In the 1988, Paul Krugman has introduced the new concept of “debt overhang” 
(1988: 2) referring to inheritance or accumulate a large volume of governmental 
debt, leading to mistrust the ability of creditors for early repayment. In other words, 
Krugman believes that a country has a real problem with debt if the expected 




Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, p. 22) have shown that a higher public debt is generally 
associated with lower rates of long term growth (at a debt level over 90%). 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff, the EU public debt (about 88.5% in 2010) is 
still below the threshold at which growth is adversely affected. They suggest that 
the debt of many developing countries already may have a negative impact on GDP 
growth.  
In the latest work of Iron and Bivens (2010, p. 6) we find the argument that a lower 
economic growth than the expectation of decision makers will strongly increase the 
deficits in developing countries. Large annual deficits, leading to a higher public 
debt will cause higher interest rates, lower levels of private investment and lower 
growth opportunity in the future. 
 
What Kind of Convergence We Want to Reach? 
The strong need to establish some nominal criteria was primarily determined by the 
particular structure of European economy, which requests a harmonious economic 
development of their members that have chosen or wish to participate to European 
Monetary Union (EMU). These nominal conditions are intended to remove any 
tensions between members, caused especially by the spread of negative effects of 
economic imbalances. 
The nominal convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty of the 
European Union, in the February 1992, were related to the introduction of common 
monetary policy, based on a single currency, managed by an independent central 
bank. Four years later, the Stability and Growth Pact aimed toward the 
coordination of national fiscal policies to ensure stability and prudence for 
budgetary climate, essential conditions for the success of EMU. 
For the new member states of European Union (EU), one of the targets sets in 
Copenhagen, in the 1993, was the adoption of European single currency within the 
shortest possible time. This objective has been misunderstood by the new member 
states, because the adoption of the Euro currency in not the end of the complex 
process of convergence but rather its beginning.  Entry into the Euro area does not 
mean removing the need to solve macroeconomic imbalances existing in the 
Member State wishing to join (Popa, 2009, p. 2).  
Another illusion of emergent economies from Central and Eastern Europe has been 
linked to the false idea that macroeconomic imbalances are a natural component of 
the convergence process, than the result of a bad management.  
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Moreover, the most of new members have been misunderstood that the 
achievement of real convergence will be easily accomplished and that is a short 
time process. The harsh lessons learned from previous accession processes, such as 
Greece, Ireland, Spain or Portugal, have shown that the catching up process takes a 
very long time and continue also a long time after accession, did not end with 
accession. For example, despite the fact that these four countries have had more 
solid economies than the new members from Eastern Europe, it is important to note 
that for the Greece the revenues fell soon after accession, for Ireland the revenues 
growth came much later than would be expected and Portugal has needed over 10 
years to gain 17% GDP per capita growth. 
Analyzing the evolution of the most used indicator for measuring the real 
convergence into EU, the GDP per capita (PPS), we can see that the catching up 
process of new member states was strongly influenced by the negative effects of 
economic crisis, turning into a stop and go process after the 2008.  
 
Table 1. GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS)  
Source: Eurostat April 2011 
It is also important to note that countries such as Romania has received a massive 
support of the population to join the European Union, over the 85% of population 
in the 2005 Barometer, support led by the expectations that after accession the 
revenues and standard of living will instantly increase. In this context, Romanian 
policy makers have tried to respond to the huge population pressure by increasing 
public wages and pensions over the national budget capacity. 
Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EU 27 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Bulgaria 26 27 27 28 30 32 34 35 37 38 40 44 44 
Estonia 42 42 42 45 46 50 54 57 62 66 69 68 64 
Latvia 35 36 36 37 39 41 43 46 49 52 56 56 52 
Lithuania 39 40 39 39 41 44 49 50 53 55 59 61 55 
Poland 47 48 49 48 48 48 49 51 51 52 54 56 61 
Portugal 78 79 81 81 80 80 79 77 79 79 79 78 80 
Romania 29 27 26 26 28 29 31 34 35 38 42 47 46 
Slovenia 78 79 81 80 80 82 83 86 87 88 88 91 88 




Many times it was considered that the process of nominal convergence has been 
privileged in relation to the real convergence, nominal fulfillment efforts 
influencing negatively the real economic variables. In fact, the two processes 
cannot be seen but complementary. Even if nominal convergence produce a 
slowing of real economic performance, fulfilling all the Maastricht criteria ensure a 
greater economic stability and a solid economic growth. 
For example, reducing inflation rate will lead to higher economic performances and 
an increase of real convergence of wages. Lower interest rates will also stimulate 
the growth of investments and the growth of real GDP. 
 
Why the Real Convergence has slowed down? 
The most frequently asked question that European governments have tried to 
respond in the last three years has been related to the optimal fiscal behavior over 
the business cycle and especially in the economic downturn. If we analyze the 
European economic recovery measures we can observe that they did not followed 
Keynesian model which recommend that fiscal policy should be countercyclical: in 
bad times the government should increase government spending and should reduce 
the taxes for helping production. European decisions have not be framed nor 
neoclassical pattern of tax-smoothing (Barro, 1979, p. 940-971) which suggest that 
fiscal policy should remain essentially neutral over the business cycle and respond 
only to unanticipated changes that may affect the government’s budget constraint. 
Empirical research has shown that opposite to developed countries, the emergent 
markets tend to promote pro-cyclical policies even in times of recession or before 
to entry into recession (Gavin & Perotti, 1997, p. 11-72). In addition, the 
international credit markets do not trust the developing countries and so become 
more difficult for government to finance the budget deficits.  
In most cases pro-cyclical temptation is due to “distortions” coming from political 
arena, which may engage projects and government spending over the national 
ability to finance them (Talvi & Vegh, 2005, p. 156-190). 
If we look at Romanian’s fiscal behavior in the last three years, the Talvi and Vegh 
hypothesis is verified, especially due to accelerated growth of public wages and 
public pensions. This action overlapped the parliamentary and local election and 
may repeat in 2012 and 2014, when elections will be held again in Romania.  
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  No. 2/2011 
 
 92 
The new Romanian agreement with International Monetary Fund will aim to give 
not only a psychological signal to international markets, but also to impregnate 
continuity for fiscal reforms, without delaying or altering them by the electoral 
events.  
 
Figure 1. Romanian fiscal policy 
Source: Romanian Ministry of Public Finance 
 
In Romania, the catching up process was based on an economic growth rate higher 
than the European average, but this growth has halted abruptly in the last quarter of 
2008. Also, the process of real convergence has a strong partner in the productivity 
growth, more than 10% annually, led by very low initial levels, the progressive 
reduction of the rate of employment in agriculture and especially by the growth of 
foreign direct investments. This substantial increase in labor productivity has been 
brought forward by the accelerated growth of wages, leading to a worsening of 
external deficit and a further inflationary pressure. 
The effects of economic crisis were felt in the most macroeconomic indicators 
since the beginning of 2009, on the one hand as a result of relatively low flexibility 
of the Romanian economy and on the other hand because of the inability of 
Romanian government to immediately adapt its macroeconomics policies to a 
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We must redraw the Main Criteria for Public Finances Stability 
Main arguments to prevent the excessive budget deficits and high public debts into 
EMU were related to the transfers between generation and to the public 
investments with a large social return. Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003, p. 
2) the present condition of the European fiscal stability has been based on the 
estimation of nominal growth rate of potential output of 5%, without taking into 
account potential external shocks, but merely the cyclical economic fluctuations. 
For example, a deficit d% would lead to an increase of public debt as ratio to GDP 
as d=g, where g is the nominal potential output. Thus, if g will be g = 3% (real 
growth) + 2% (inflation) = 5% and d proposed by SGP d = 3%, the ratio of debt to 
GDP will be estimated as: 
d=g 
 (d =3%) =[g = 3% (real growth) + 2% (inflation)] lead to a 60% debt ratio to GDP, 
level of EU Treaty. 
If we will estimate this level for an emerging country like Romania, we will find 
out that 60% ratio is overvalued:  








Debt ratio by 
SGP deficit  
Debt ratio by 
real deficit 
2007 3% 3,10% 6,30% 4,90% 26,79% 27,68% 
2008 3% 4,80% 7,30% 7,90% 19,74% 31,58% 
2009 3% 7,40% 7,10% 5,60% 15,15% 37,37% 
2010 3% 6,80% 1,30% 6,10% 34,48% 78,16% 
2011 3% 4,40% 1,50% 7,00% 35,29% 51,76% 
Data source: Eurostat April 2011 
 
The Reinhart and Rogoff(2010: 7) estimation of debt threshold cannot be tested on 
Eastern European countries due to lack of data for long time, especially in the 
communist regime. In addition, countries like Romania have not ever faced with 
higher rate of debt of 40%. 
It seems to be too clearly that a public debt threshold of 35% of GDP for Romania 
is the highest limit of confidence, especially for foreign investors and credit 
markets too. This debt threshold is lower than the IMF estimation, 40% of GDP 
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(Cottarelli, 2010, p. 7), which took into consideration the negative perspectives of 
aging population.  
Unfortunately, Romania is not the only new Members State to which the accepted 
level of public debt on GDP in terms of nominal convergence should be revised. 
Countries with similar position are Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia or Lithuania. 
Then, it is really difficult to predict when the economies of new Members States 
will be able to fit into the central bank inflation targets. For Romania, the failure to 
target inflation was mainly driven by the requirement to adjust the minimum 
European duty level, by increasing the value added tax, from 19% to 24% as a 
result of government failure to find alternative solutions to restrict the huge 
governmental expenditures and the dynamics of imported food prices and the 
increase of international fuel prices. 
It must be said that the nominal condition of 3% of GDP sets by SGP for fiscal 
deficit may affects the real convergence of those economies in which the 
investment volume is really weak. For this reason, the governments may choose 
higher deficits than 3%, in order to stimulate the public investments. 
The public investments have been the strong argument used by the new Members 
States of EU in order to justify their excessive deficits. Unfortunately, we cannot 
say exactly if there is a strong relationship between a higher fiscal deficit and 
public investment levels in the new Member States, an unconfirmed hypothesis 
even by the IMF research (Graeme Justice and Anca Paliu, 2006, p. 10). 
Moreover, this kind of financial stability evaluation, used by European 
Commission, do not respond to other critical conditions of macroeconomic stability 
like structural imbalances of developing economies, exchange rate, interest rates 
and a huge demand for finance in the international shocks circumstance. Recent 
history has shown us that there were emerging countries, especially in Latin 
America, that have entered into default at a lower level of debt ratio than 40%. For 
example, Romania faces the following situation: a steady decline in young people 
which can be involved in the labor market accompanied by a fast growing number 
of pensioners, the dependence degree in pay as you go system is already of 0.79 
employees to one pensioner. The structural budgetary deficit created only by such 
negative demographic situation has already reached 2.64% of GDP and is expected 
to increase until 2050.Other structural difficulties are related to low capacity to 
collect the revenue from economy, corruption and tax evasion affecting over 11% 




We also have to specify that there are more ways to count the fiscal deficits and 
public debt too. Eastern economies still holding huge enterprises and companies 
whose losses are not quantified neither into so-called quasi-fiscal deficit. It is also 
important to mention what kind of public debt we are talking about. Because there 
is a debt contracted directly by governments and a debt contracted by other public 
authorities but guaranteed by same governments.  
We believe that for a more accurate assessment of fiscal sustainability will have 
take into account the debt of state-owned companies when we estimate the fiscal 
deficit and must to include the debt guaranteed into total public debt. 
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